INTRODUCTION
Auditing the changes to a database is critical for identifying malicious behavior, maintaining data quality, and improving system performance. But an accurate audit log is a historical record of the past that can also pose a serious threat to privacy. In many domains, retention policies govern how long data can be preserved by an institution. Regulations like FERPA and HIPAA (in the U.S.) or the Directive of Data Protection (in the EU), require strict retention periods to be observed, mandating the disposal of past data. In addition, institutions often adopt their own retention policies, choosing to remove sensitive data after a period of time to avoid its unintended release, or to avoid disclosure that could be forced by subpeona.
Policies that limit data retention conflict with the goal of accurate auditing, and data owners have to carefully balance the need for accurate auditing with the privacy goals of retention policies. Unfortunately, existing technologies make balancing these goals difficult. Most database systems include audit logs, but there are few mechanisms for limiting access to logs beyond wholesale destruction of the log for a given time period. Some proposed database systems support persistence, in which past states are retained. These can be used for some (but not all) audit functions, and also lack effective protection mechanisms for past versions of data.
The AuditGuard system is a flexible database audit mechanism which retains history and enforces retention policy. It allows an auditor to selectively remove data from a log of the past, while still retaining non-sensitive aspects of history that can be vital to an audit. The main components of the AuditGuard system are the following:
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Retention policies AuditGuard's distinctive feature is that it supports retention policies, which remove or protect past data from disclosure. For example, a typical policy might require that an employee's salary be removed from the database prior to 5 years ago, or that the records of employees working on Project X be removed from the history.
Incomplete history Applying such retention policies causes the (physical or logical) removal of individual data values or entire tuples from the historical record. Once retention policies have been applied, the AuditGuard system stores a partially incomplete record of history that respects the privacy goals of the policy.
Querying incompleteness A key feature of the AuditGuard system is the capability to evaluate audit queries over the protected, incomplete audit history that results from policy application. Naturally, some audit queries cannot be answered as accurately while respecting the retention policies. AuditGuard presents partial answers whenever possible, representing directly the uncertainty introduced by the retention policy.
The main benefit of AuditGuard is the enforcement of retention policies along with the ability to get audit query answers where none would be possible before. In particular, AuditGuard allows sensitive values to be removed, while retaining the history of changes to values for auditing. Such a sanitized audit log can meet many of the goals of the auditor by reporting on who made changes, when changes were made, and in what context they were made. At the same time disclosure of sensitive information can still be avoided.
AUDITING HISTORY
In this section we present the main components of the AuditGuard system by reference to an example scenario.
Historical Data Model
The AuditGuard data model stores, for each table of the user schema, a transaction-time table [8] and an operational history table. The transaction-time table records a complete history of tuples' state. The active time period of a tuple is indicated by the transaction time of creation (i.e. after insert or update) and the transaction time of deletion (or the special value now for active tuples). User modifications to the database are applied to the current snapshot only, and to the database. We do not audit read-only queries. As a running example we consider auditing a simple Employee database with an original schema Emp(name, dept, salary). Table 1a shows T , the transaction-time table recording the department and salary history for employees Bob and Chris. The columns from and to are added to the original schema. Table 1b shows H, the operational history table. We assume for this example that name is the primary key of T , that each operation is assigned a unique transaction time, ttime, and that each update operation in H changes exactly one tuple in the original table. The attr column in H indicates the attribute changed by an operation if it is an update query, or all if it is an insert or delete operation.
A Language for Auditing Queries
AG-SQL is an extension to SQL designed to support queries over the transaction-time and operational history tables. The formal semantics of our language (omitted due to space constraints) is based on extended relational algebra operators for temporal relations [4, 8, 11] . The following are examples of simple auditing queries that can be expressed over the Employee history described by tables T and H: A1, in fact, includes no temporal features, consisting of standard SQL. In such situations, the transaction-time tables listed in FROM are treated as traditional tables with additional time attributes. In A2, T(now) is the current snapshot of table T. Attributes from and to in the SELECT clause indicate that the result will be a transaction time table. In A3, the TEMPORAL identifier in the FROM clause declares a temporal join of tables.
Data Retention Policies
A retention policy specifies time periods for which data or documents should be retained, and limits on retention. The AuditGuard prototype supports two kinds of retention policies which are used to limit the lifetime of data in our historical data model.
The first is called redaction. When redaction is applied to an attribute value it removes the value, but does not hide its existence. Redaction can be applied to any combination of attributes, an entire tuple, or sets of tuples. The second operation is called expunction. When a tuple is expunged, its values are removed, along with a record of its existence. These two operators serve fundamentally different purposes as they enact value removal in one case and existence removal in the other. Our example scenario will focus on the redaction policy operator, as illustrated in these simple policies:
P1: Hide Bob's salary prior to time 200. P2: Hide Chris's salary and dept prior to time 400.
Policies can be specified by the following SQL-like language. A policy can be evaluated like a SELECT query in SQL, but with the addition of a WHEN clause indicates the retention period. The language enables flexibility and expressiveness of policy customization, and policies can be freely combined.
EXPUNGE | REDACT attribute-list FROM table-list WHERE condition-list WHEN time-condition-list
The meaning of an individual redaction policy rule on relation R, which is denoted pR(k, a, t), is as follows: for the tuple τ ∈ r with k as its value of key, all values of attribute a before time t should be removed from the database. It should not be possible for a user to infer these values from the database instance accessible after policy application.
Applying Retention Policies
Applying a retention policy to a database changes history, removing sensitive information. Removal can be physical (history is deleted from physical storage) or logical (history is inaccessible to some class of users, but still stored physically). The AuditGuard prototype currently implements physical removal, but logical removal is clearly important in order to support conflicting retention policies for multiple parties.
Whether removal is logical or physical, application of a retention policy results in an incomplete database, representing a set of possible worlds (or more precisely, a set of possible histories). The set of possible worlds is introduced by attribute variables and a tuple status indicator. The variables represent an unknown value from a given domain. The tuple status specifies whether a tuple exists in all the possible histories.
Applying this policy set P = {P 1, P 2} to the database consisting of T and H, we get an incomplete transactiontime table T P (shown as Table 2 ). The operational table H is unchanged 2 . In T P , redacted values have been replaced by a set of variables {sx, sy, dx}. The domain of sx and sy is dom(sal); the domain of dx is dom(dept). Distinct variables in the same column are assumed to take distinct values. An additional column status, with domain {p, c}, has been added in the representation of T P . A status of c means the tuple is certain to be present in the relation; p means the existence of the tuple is merely possible. In general, each policy set P will cause a series of removals on T , H (or both) over the specified time period. Policy application results in incomplete information tables [7, 1] , T P and H P , which represent a set of possible worlds. A mapping of each variable present in T P into an element of its domain defines a possible world in the expected way: all certain tuples must be in present, and any subset of the possible tuple may optionally be present. It is not hard to show that, for any policy P , the application of P is truth-preserving: the original database (T, H) is one of the possible worlds described by (T P , H P ). Policy application causes an unavoidable loss of information, but much of the information about the sequence of changes applied to the database may remain. The AuditGuard system can evaluate audit queries over the incomplete history and still return useful answers.
AUDITING INCOMPLETENESS
AuditGuard is designed to support audit queries over the incomplete history resulting from retention policy application. Answers to our audit queries on an incomplete history have the expected semantics, representing the set of possible answers on the possible worlds. We can show that for the kind of incompleteness introduced by our policies, AG-SQL query answers can be represented concisely in our data model [5] .
Returning to the three auditing queries discussed previously, Table 3 A3. Return the name and time of update for all employees whose salary was updated by Chris while Chris was not in the HR department. This query includes one certain tuple and one possible tuple. From the incomplete history it is clear that Bob's salary was updated by Chris at time 500 when Chris was not in HR. However, Bob's salary was also updated at time 200 by Chris, but Chris's department is unknown at that time. Therefore, (Bob, 200) is a possible answer for this query. The audit query contains some uncertainty, but provides a superset of the true answer.
IMPLEMENTATION
We implement AuditGuard by translating our historical data model into standard relations in Postgres. The prototype implementation includes the following:
Managing historical data. Each modification (insert, update and delete) on a user-defined table triggers a series of operations on the corresponding transaction-time table and operational log. The original persistence features of Postgres have been deprecated in recent software releases and are not used in our implementation.
Managing retention policies. AuditGuard provides a simple but powerful language to specify retention policies. As we discussed above, policies can be implemented logically or physically. AuditGuard currently supports physical removal which means expired history will disappear from the database after execution of the policy. AuditGuard translates the policy into update queries which will delete or modify some parts of history, introducing tuple-variables.
Implementing Query Evaluation. Query evaluation is implemented by transforming AQ-SQL queries into standard relational operators that can be optimized and executed
